TLS is by far the most important protocol on the Internet for negotiating secure session keys and providing authentication. Only very recently, the standard ciphersuites of TLS have been shown to provide provably secure guarantees under a new notion called Authenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE) introduced by Jager et al. at CRYPTO'12. In this work, we analyse the variants of TLS that make use of pre-shared keys (TLS-PSK). In various environments, TLS-PSK is an interesting alternative for remote authentication between servers and constrained clients like smart cards, for example for mobile phone authentication, EMV-based payment transactions or authentication via electronic ID cards. First, we introduce a new and strong definition of ACCE security that covers protocols with pre-shared keys. Next, we prove that all ciphersuite families of TLS-PSK meet our strong notion of ACCE security. Our results do not rely on random oracles nor on any non-standard assumption.
Introduction
TLS is undeniably the most prominent key exchange protocol in use today. While the security of most web applications relies on the classical Diffie-Hellman and RSA-based ciphersuites of TLS, there also exist several important applications that make use of one of the less common ciphersuites [49, 1, 42] . One such application is (remote) authentication of resource-restricted clients like smart-cards. In these scenarios, computational efficiency and low power consumption often are one of the most important system features. Instead of using the public-key based ciphersuites of TLS, applications can apply a variant of TLS that assumes pre-shared symmetric keys between client and server. The corresponding ciphersuite family is termed TLS with pre-shared keys (TLS-PSK) and available in many TLS releases and libraries [41, 35, 10, 44, 45, 46, 48, 11] .
Related Work: On the Security of TLS. Since the introduction of its predecessor SSL, the security of TLS has often been the focus of security researchers and attackers worldwide. Over the time, several attacks on TLS have been published. Most of these attacks do not directly attack the cryptographic core of TLS, but rather exploit side-channels or vulnerabilities in associated technologies, like the famous Bleichenbacher attack [8] , or attacks on the domain name system or the TLS with Pre-Shared Keys. The original specifications of the TLS protocol [15, 16, 17] do not explicitly include ciphersuites that support authentication and key exchange using pre-shared keys. However, since 2005 there exists an extension called "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security" (TLS-PSK) which specifically describes such ciphersuites in RFC 4279 [19] . (Yet another extension termed "TLS Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption" proposes variants of the TLS-PSK ciphersuites that can be used only for authentication, i.e. when channel encryption is disabled [9] .) The TLS-PSK standard specifies three ciphersuites, TLS_PSK, TLS_RSA_PSK and TLS_DHE_PSK, each of which derives the master secret in a different way. In TLS_PSK, the master secret is solely based on the secret pre-shared keys. In the remaining ciphersuites the computation of the master secret is additionally dependent on freshly exchanged secrets via encrypted key transport in TLS_RSA_PSK or Diffie-Hellman key exchange in TLS_DHE_PSK. The intuition is that as long as either the pre-shared key or the freshly exchanged secret is not compromised, then the Handshake layer yields a secure application key. All three ciphersuites assume that the client only has a pre-shared key for authentication. Although it is not as widespread as TLS with RSA key transport, several interesting and important scenarios for TLS with pre-shared keys exist.
• Since November 2010, the new electronic German ID (eID) card supports online remote authentication of the eID card holder to some online service (eService). The most important network channel involved in the eID online authentication mechanism is a TLS channel, where the eID card shares symmetric keys with the authentication endpoints. Here TLS-PSK is applied to perform mutual authentication between the card holder and some online service. A technical report by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) [21] describes in detail how the pre-shared key known to the eID-Server and the eService is bound to the TLS channel.
• As a second example, we mention the application of TLS-PSK in the Generic Authentication Architecture, the 3GGP mobile phone standard for UMTS and LTE. According to ETSI TR 133 919 V11.0.0 (2012-11), TLS-PSK can be used to secure the communication between server and user equipment (e.g. handheld telephone or laptop with a mobile broadband adapter).
• An IETF draft from 2009 for EMV smart cards describes an authentication protocol based on TLS-PSK [42] . EMV chips are widely deployed and are used commonly for secure payment transactions [13] . The draft describes how the identity information and pre-shared keys stored on the EMV chip can be used to establish a TLS-PSK channel.
The main advantage of TLS-PSK over the standard ciphersuites (with self-signed certificates) is that it avoids computationally expensive public key operations. This particularly pays off in systems with energy-constrained devices like mobile phones or mobile payment stations. Often, in such systems the end points are initialized with pre-shared keys in some secure environment. At the same time, the network layout is hierarchical such that clients technically only directly communicate with a trusted central server that in turn routes their messages to the intended communication partner. This keeps the size of the key material that has to be stored in the clients small and virtually static. Its efficiency makes TLS-PSK a much more attractive alternative in these scenarios than, for example, TLS with self-signed certificates.
Contribution. In this paper, we provide a security analysis of all three TLS-PSK ciphersuites. Similar to classical TLS, it is provably impossible to show that the keys produced by TLS-PSK are indistinguishable from random. Therefore, as one of our main contributions, we introduce the first definition of ACCE security for authentication protocols with pre-shared keys. We do not propose a separate model but rather an extension of the ACCE model of JKSS to also cover authentication via pre-shared keys. Next, we introduce a strengthened variant of this definition called asymmetric perfect forward secrecy, that captures that protocol sessions of ACCE protocols with pre-shared keys may retain a strong level of confidentiality even if the long-term secrets of the client are exposed after the protocol run. Asymmetric perfect forward secrecy is a strong security notion that can hold for protocols that do not fulfill the standard notion of perfect forward secrecy. This allows us to prove the security of such protocols in a stronger security model than was previously possible. We show that TLS_PSK is ACCE secure (without forward secrecy), TLS_RSA_PSK is ACCE secure with asymmetric perfect forward secrecy and TLS_DHE_PSK is secure with (classical) perfect forward secrecy. Informally, our results say that TLS-PSK guarantees confidentiality and integrity of all messages exchange between client and server, unless the adversary has learned the pre-shared key or corrupted one of the parties to learn the application/session key. In TLS_DHE_PSK the communication remains confidential even if the adversary corrupts the pre-shared secret later on. In contrast, in TLS_RSA_PSK the communication remains confidential even if the adversary manages to corrupt the pre-shared key or the server's long-term key later on, but not both of them. We provide an overview of our results in Figure 1 . 
Double
PRFs and Perfect Forward Secrecy. To prove our results on TLS_RSA_PSK and TLS_DHE_PSK, we introduce a variant of pseudo-random functions (PRFs), called double pseudorandom function (DPRF). Roughly, a DPRF takes as input two keys only one of which is generated randomly and kept secret from the attacker (as in classical PRFs). However, when the adversary makes its queries, not only the message but also the other key can entirely be specified by the adversary. Our notion of DPRF nicely abstracts the crucial mechanism in TLS-PSK that is required to guarantee (asymmetric) perfect forward secrecy. In our security proofs, we assume that TLS's key derivation function provides a suitable DPRF in the standard model. Existing results on the security of HMAC directly support this assumption for TLS 1.1 when the pre-shared key has a specific bit length. We believe that our new DPRF notion, can be of independent interest beyond the scope of this work. Note also, that for the TLS_PSK and TLS_DHE_PSK ciphersuites we neither have to rely on nonstandard assumptions like the PRF-ODH assumption of JKSS to give a proof nor on idealized setup assumptions like the random oracle model. We can show that TLS_RSA_PSK is secure under our basic notion of ACCE security without any assumption on the public key encryption system used in TLS. However, if we want to prove the ACCE security of TLS_RSA_PSK with asymmetric perfect forward secrecy in the standard model we need to assume that the public key encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure, similar to [32, 28] . We remark that [32] were also able to prove security of the classical TLS ciphersuites based on RSA key transport in the random oracle model.
Limitations. In our work, we give a dedicated security analysis for TLS-PSK. We believe that it is possible to give a more modularized analysis, similar to KPW [32] who analyzed the classical ciphersuites of TLS by abstracting the handshake phase into a Constrained-CCA-secure (CCCA) key encapsulation mechanism that is combined with a secure authenticated encryption scheme. The benefit of the KPW analysis is re-usability: once the security proof of TLS is established for a generic CCCA secure KEM, all that remains is to show that each of the ciphersuites indeed provides such a key encapsulation mechanism.
We emphasize once again that TLS_RSA_PSK can be shown to be ACCE secure (without forward secrecy) without imposing any assumptions on the public key system used for the transport of the ephemeral key. This is because under the basic ACCE definition security can be derived solely from secrecy of the pre-shared keys. We stress that when showing that TLS_RSA_PSK provides asymmetric perfect forward secrecy, we do not consider TLS-RSA with RSA-PKCS encryption as it is currently used in practice. Instead we rather assume that TLS uses a generic IND-CCA secure encryption scheme that is secure in the standard model. It would be interesting to show that the results of KPW on TLS-RSA with RSA-PKCS encryption can be transferred to show that TLS-PSK with RSA-PKCS based key transport provides asymmetric perfect forward secrecy in the random oracle model.
Preliminaries
In the following we will briefly recall the definitions and primitives our analysis relies on. We denote with ∅ the empty string, and with [n] = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N the set of integers between 1 and n. We use ⊕ to denote XOR. If A is a set, then a $ ← A denotes the action of sampling a uniformly random element from A. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then a $ ← A denotes that A is run with fresh random coins and returns a. In the following, κ will denote the security parameter.
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let G be a group of prime order q. Let g be a generator of G. Given (g, g a , g b , g c ) for a, b, c ∈ Z q the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption says that it is hard to decide whether c = ab mod q. Definition 1. We say that the DDH problem is (t, DDH )-hard in G, if for all adversaries A that run in time t it holds that for a, b, z
where the probability is over the random coins of A and the random choices of a, b, z.
Collision-Resistant Hash Function
A collision-resistant hash function is a deterministic algorithm Hash which given a key k ∈ K Hash (with log(|K Hash |) polynomial in κ) and a bit string m outputs a hash value w = Hash(k, x) in the hash space {0, 1} χ (with χ polynomial in κ). If k is clear from the context we write Hash(·) short for Hash(k, ·).
Definition 2. We say that Hash is a (t, )-secure collision-resistant hash function, if any t-time adversary A that is given k $ ← K Hash has an advantage of at most to compute two inputs m, m with m = m and Hash(m) = Hash(m ).
Public Key Schemes
A public key encryption (PKE) scheme consists of three polynomial time algorithms PKE =(PKE.Gen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) with the following semantics:
• (pk, sk) $ ← PKE.Gen(1 κ ): is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm which generates a (public) encryption key pk and a secret decryption key sk on input of the security parameter κ.
• C $ ← PKE.Enc(pk, m): is a probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm which takes as inputs a public key pk and a message m, outputs ciphertext C ∈ C, where C is a ciphertext space.
• m ← PKE.Dec(sk, C): is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a key sk and a ciphertext C ∈ C, and outputs either a message m ∈ M, where M is a message space, or an error symbol ⊥.
The (IND-CCA) security of a PKE scheme PKE = (PKE.Gen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) via the following game that is played between a challenger and an adversary.
Stateful Length-Hiding Authenticated Encryption
We use the stateful variant of LHAE security (sLHAE) as originally defined by Paterson et al. [43] and used by JKSS [25] for their analysis of TLS-DHE. Paterson et al. showed that the CBC-based record layer encryption of TLS meets the notion of sLHAE under suitable assumptions on the used cryptographic components and the implementation. A stateful symmetric encryption scheme basically consists of two algorithms StE = (StE.Enc, StE.Dec).
• (C, st e ) $ ← StE.Enc(k, len, H, m, st e ): takes as input a secret key k ∈ K sLHAE , an output ciphertext length len ∈ N, some header data H ∈ {0, 1} * , a plaintext m ∈ M sLHAE , and the current state st e ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs either a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1} len and an updated state st e or an error symbol ⊥ if for instance the output length len is not valid for the message m.
• The security is formalized in the following security game that is played between a challenger C and an adversary A. 
2.
A may adaptively query the encryption oracle ENC q ENC times and the decryption oracle DEC q DEC times.
3. Finally, A outputs its guess b ∈ {0, 1}. 
Plain Pseudo-Random Functions.
Let PRF : K PRF × M PRF → R PRF denote a family of deterministic functions, where K PRF is the key space, M PRF is the domain and R PRF is the range of PRF.
To define security, we consider the following security game played between a challenger C and an adversary A. Let π PRF (·) denote an oracle implemented by C, which takes as input a message m ∈ M PRF and outputs a value z ∈ R PRF . 2. The adversary may adaptively make queries x i for 1 ≤ i ≤ q to oracle π PRF (·) and receives the result depending on the random bit b.
3. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b ∈ {0, 1} of b. If b = b the adversary wins.
We assume that the overall number of queries made to the challenger is q = q(κ). As before, we call P r [b = b ] the success probability of the adversary in winning the above game. We call
Definition 5. We say that PRF is a (t, )-secure pseudo-random function, if any adversary running in time t has an advantage of at most to distinguish the PRF from a truly random function, i.e.
while the number of allowed queries q is upper bounded by t.
Double Pseudo-Random Functions
Double pseudo-random functions can be thought of a class of PRFs with two keys. Let DPRF : K DPRF 1 ×K DPRF 2 ×M DPRF → R DPRF denote a family of deterministic functions, where K DPRF 1 , K DPRF 2 is the key space, M DPRF is the domain and R DPRF is the range of PRF. Intuitively, security requires that the output of the DPRF is indistinguishable from random as long as one key remains hidden from the adversary even if the adversary is able to adaptively specify the second key and the input message. To formalize security we consider the following security game played between a challenger C and an adversary A. Let RF DPRF (·, ·) denote an oracle implemented by C, which takes as input a key k j ∈ K DPRF j (where j is specified by the adversary through via an Init query) and message m ∈ M DPRF and outputs a random value z ∈ R DPRF .
1. The adversary first runs Init(j) with j ∈ {1, 2} to specify the key k j ∈ K DPRF j that he wants to manipulate.
2. The challenger C samplesb $ ← {0, 1}, and sets u = (j mod 2) + 1. Ifb = 0, the challenger samples k u ∈ R K DPRFu and assigns RF DPRF (·, ·) to either DPRF(·, k 2 , ·) or DPRF(k 1 , ·, ·) depending on the value of u. For instance, if u = 2 then the random function RF DPRF is assigned to DPRF(·, k 2 , ·), and the A is allowed to specify k 1 arbitrarily in each query. Ifb = 1, the challenger assigns RF DPRF to RF(·, ·) which is a truly random function that takes as input key k j and message m and outputs a value in the same range R DPRF as DPRF(·, ·, ·).
3. The adversary may adaptively make queries k j,i , m i for 1 ≤ i ≤ q to oracle RF DPRF and receives the result of RF DPRF (k j,i , m i ), where k j,i denotes the i-th key k j chosen by A.
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guessb ∈ {0, 1} ofb. Ifb =b the adversary wins.
As before, we let Pr b =b denote the success probability of the adversary and Pr b =b − 1/2 its advantage.
Definition 6. We say that DPRF is a (t, )-secure pseudo-random function, if any adversary running in probabilistic polynomial time t has at most an advantage of to distinguish the DPRF from a truly random function, i.e.
Again the number of allowed queries q is upper bounded by t.
Observe that any (t, )-secure DPRF trivially gives rise to a plain PRF: if the DPRF is secure after adaptive message queries -even when one of the keys can be specified by the adversary -it remains of course secure when both keys are chosen at random and kept secret from the adversary. However, such a function can be viewed as a PRF where the key space consist of all possible pairs of keys (k 1 , k 2 ). Also, if the DPRF can generate output values which are indistinguishable from random if the adversary adaptively specifies keys and messages, it remains secure if the adversary is only allowed to specify messages. The following lemma holds for any message space and output space.
Proof. To show that DPRF(k 1 , k 2 , m) is a (t, PRF )-secure PRF for key space K DPRF 1 (or key space K DPRF 2 ) we can imagine a PRF simulator that simply queries Init(0) (or Init(1)) to its DPRF challenger and subsequently only relays the message queries and responses. To show that DPRF(k 1 , k 2 , m) is a (t, PRF )-secure PRF for key space K DPRF 1 × K DPRF 2 we use that it is a PRF for K DPRF 1 and key space K DPRF 2 . So as long as either k 1 or k 2 is chosen uniformly at random DPRF(k 1 , k 2 , m) is a PRF even independent of the choice of the other key. However it of course remains a PRF if the other key is chosen uniformly as well.
A Practical Construction of a DPRF from PRFs. There is a simple way to construct a DPRF from two PRFs. Assume we have two PRFs PRF(·, ·) :
We can then construct a DPRF with K DPRF 1 = K PRF and K DPRF 2 = K PRF and message space M DPRF = M PRF . On input k 1 ∈ K DPRF 1 and k 2 ∈ K DPRF 2 and message m ∈ M DPRF , the DPRF proceeds as follows: Game 0. This game equals the DPRF security experiment. Thus, for some DPRF we have
Game 1. Assume the adversary queries Init(j) with j ∈ 1, 2. Let u = (j mod 2) + 1. In this game, we either change the function PRF(k * 1 , ·) to a truly random function RF(·) (if u = 1) or the function PRF (k * 2 , ·) (if u = 2). If there exists a polynomial time adversary A that can distinguish this game from the previous game, we can construct an algorithm B using A that breaks the security of PRF or PRF . Exploiting the security of PRF (or PRF ), we have that
Since DPRF's output is computed as
we also have that even when the adversary entirely and adaptively specifies either PRF(k 1 , m) or PRF (k 2 , m) via theueries granted in the DPRF game, the output DPRF(k 1 , k 2 , m) is still indistinguishable from random as the other PRF output PRF (k 2 , m) or PRF(k 1 , m) remains random. Therefore, if only one PRF is exchanged with a truly random function, the entire function DPRF(k 1 , k 2 , m) behaves like a truly random function. We have
To show that this game is indistinguishable from the previous one observe that B can simulate the RF DPRF (k j , ·) queries made by A as π PRF ⊕ PRF(k j , ·) where π PRF is the oracle in the PRF security experiment. If π PRF = RF(·) then B's simulation yields a distribution that is equal to this game, otherwise it is equal to the previous game. Finally, B can simply forward A's response to its challenger in the PRF game.
Collecting probabilities from Game 0 to Game 1 yields Lemma 2. This section describes the three sets of ciphersuites specified in TLS-PSK: TLS_PSK, TLS_RSA_PSK and TLS_DHE_PSK. In each of these ciphersuites, the master secret is computed using pre-shared keys which are symmetric keys shared in advance among the communicating parties. The main differences are in the way the master secret is computed. As sketched before, in TLS_RSA_PSK the computation of the master secret is additionally dependent on a random value produced by the client that is sent to the server encrypted with its public key. In TLS_DHE_PSK the master secret is computed using the pre-shared keys and a fresh DiffieHellman key that is exchanged between client and server. The following description is valid for all TLS_PSK versions. The TLS handshake protocol consists of 10 messages, whose content ranges from constant byte values to tuples of cryptographic values. Not all messages are relevant for our security proof, we list them merely for completeness. All messages are prepended with a numeric tag that identifies the type of message, a length value, and the version number of TLS. Also, all messages are sent through the 'TLS Record Layer', which at startup provides no encryption nor any other cryptographic transformations.
ClientHello. Message m 1 is the ClientHello message. In this message, one or more TLS-PSK ciphersuites that are supported by the client are included. For our analysis the only important value is r C , the random value chosen by the client. It consists of 32 bytes (256 Bits), where 4 Bytes are usually used to encode the local time of the client. The remaining 28 Bytes are chosen randomly by the client. If the client wants to resume a previous TLS session, he may optionally include a TLS session ID value received from the server in a previous session. (This value is not protected cryptographically and should thus not be confused with session IDs used in formal security proofs.) This is followed by a list cs-list of ciphersuites, where each ciphersuite is a tuple of key exchange method, signing, encryption and MAC algorithms, coded as two bytes. Data compression is possible before encryption and is signaled by the inclusion of zero or more compression methods.
ServerHello. The ServerHello message m 2 has the same structure as ClientHello. The TLSserver can select one of the PSK ciphersuites specified by the client and includes this ciphersuite in the ServerHello message. In our analysis the value r S is important which is drawn randomly by the server.
ServerCertificate. For TLS_PSK and TLS_DHE_PSK, the message is not included. In TLS_RSA_PSK cert S contains a public key that is bound to the server's identity.
ServerKeyExchange. Since clients and servers may have pre-shared keys with many different parties, in the ServerKeyExchange message m 4 , the TLS-Server provides a PSK identity hint pointing to the PSK used for authentication. However, for ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange parameters are also contained in the ServerKeyExchange messages including information on the DH group (e.g. a large prime number p ∈ {0, 1} poly(κ) , where κ is the security parameter, and a generator g for a prime-order q subgroup of Z * p ), and the DH share T S (T S = g t S , where t S is a random value in Z q ). (We implictly assume that the client checks whether the received parameters are valid, in particular if T S is indeed in the group generated by g.)
ServerHelloDone. The ServerHelloDone message m 5 does not contain any data, but consists only of a constant tag with byte-value '14' and a length value '0'. The server sends this message in order to inform the client to proceed with the next phase of the protocol.
ClientKeyExchange. Message m 6 is called ClientKeyExchange. We describe the contents of this message for TLS_DHE_PSK, TLS_PSK and TLS_RSA_PSK separately:
• For TLS_PSK, the message is not included.
• For ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange TLS_DHE_PSK, it contains the Diffie-Hellman share T C of the client, i.e. T C = g t C .
• For the RSA-based key exchange TLS_RSA_PSK the client selects a 46-byte random value R and sends a 2-byte version number V and the 46-byte random value R encrypted under the server's RSA public key to the server.
Also, the client send an identifier for the pre-shared key it is going to use when communicating with the server. This information is called PSK identity.
ChangeCipherSpec. To signal the 'start of encryption' to the server, the client sends message m 7 ChangeCipherSpec that simply contains the byte value '1' to the server.
ClientFinished. The next data to be sent is the ClientFinished message, m 8 , which consists of an encryption C C of fin C concatenated with a MAC value. The messages C C and fin C are computed as follows: fin C := PRF(ms, label 3 ||H(m 1 || . . . ||m 7 )) and C C := StE.Enc(k Client enc , len, H, fin C , st e ). The application key k Client enc and the master secret ms are described below.
ServerFinished. After the server has received messages m 8 , the server can also compute pms, ms, the encryption and MAC keys, and the ServerFinished message fin S . He can then decrypt m 8 and check fin C by computing the pseudo-random value on the messages sent and received by the server. If this check fails, the server 'rejects' and aborts the handshake. If the check is successful, he 'accepts' and sends the message m 9 containing C S which is the encryption of fin S to the client. The messages C S and fin S are computed as follows: fin S := PRF(ms, label 4 ||H(m 1 || . . . ||m 9 )) and C S := StE.Enc(k Server enc , len, H, fin S , st e ). Computing The Master Secret. According to the original specification, released as RFC 4279 [19] , the key derivation function of TLS, denoted here as PRF TLS , is used when constructing the master secret. PRF TLS takes as input a secret, a seed, and an identifying label and produces an output of arbitrary length. We first describe the generic computation of the master secret ms for all ciphersuites using pre-shared keys. Then, a detailed description of all cases (TLS_PSK, TLS_DHE_PSK, and TLS_RSA_PSK) is provided. The master secret ms is computed as follows:
• TLS_PSK case: For TLS_PSK version, the client/server is able to compute the master secret ms using the pre-master secret pms, from which all further secret values are derived. If the PSK is N bytes long, the pms consists of the 2-byte representation (uint16) of the integer value N, N zero bytes, the 2-byte representation of N once again, and the PSK itself, i.e. pms := N ||0...0||N ||PSK. Since the first half of pms is constant for any PSK we get for TLS_PSK that the entire security of PRF TLS only relies on the second half of pms.
• TLS_DHE_PSK case: Let Z be the value produced for DH-based ciphersuites, i.e. Z =g
The pms consists of a concatenation of four values: the uint16 len Z indicating the length of Z, Z itself, the uint16 len P SK showing the length of the PSK, and the PSK itself: pms := len Z ||Z||len P SK ||PSK.
• TLS_RSA_PSK case: First, the pre-master secret concatenates the uint16 constant C = 48, the 2-byte version number V and a 46-byte random value R, the uint16 len P SK containing the length of the PSK, and the PSK itself, i.e. pms := C||V||R||len P SK ||PSK.
Computing The Application Keys. After computing the master secret ms, it is stored for the lifetime of the TLS session, and pms is erased from memory. The master secret ms is subsequently used, together with the two random nonces and another fixed label 2 , to derive all encryption and MAC keys. The following four application keys (encryption and MAC keys for each direction) are computed by using PRF TLS , where the inputs are now the master secret ms, label 2 and r C , r S . More precisely, the key material k Client
where k Client enc is used to encrypt and authenticate data sent from the client to the server, and k Client dec is used to decrypt and verify data received from the server.
On the Security of PRF TLS
In our security proof of TLS_PSK we assume that the pseudo-random function of TLS (PRF TLS ) that is used for the computation of the master-secret constitutes a secure PRF in the standard model when applied with pms as the key. However, to prove (asymmetric) perfect forward secrecy in TLS_DHE_PSK and TLS_RSA_PSK we assume that PRF TLS constitutes a secure DPRF (in the standard model) where the key space of the DPRF consists of the key space of the pre-shared key and the key space of the freshly generated RSA or Diffie-Hellman secret. In the following we will analyse the plausibility of these assumptions in the light of existing results. What considerably complicates our analysis is that TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 specify different implementations of PRF TLS . We therefore start with a detailed description of PRF TLS in TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2
Implementation of PRF TLS in TLS 1.1. In TLS 1.1, the output of the key derivation is computed as:
where pms1 is the first half of the pre-master secret and pms2 is the second half, i.e. pms = pms1||pms2. As described in detail before, in TLS-PSK the input message m is derived from some constant, public label and the messages exchanged in the protocol so far (depending on the ciphersuite used). HMAC_MD5 is computed from several concatenations and iterations of HMAC_MD5 that all use the same input key pms1. Similarly, HMAC_SHA is computed from several concatenations and iterations of HMAC_SHA that again all use the same input key pms2.
In general, the data expansion function HMAC_X (k,m) for key k and message m is defined as
where the A(i) are defined as
In the above, we use HMAC_X to refer to the standard HMAC algorithm that uses X as the underlying hash function [30] . TLS allows to generate arbitrary output lengths for HMAC_X (that are not necessarily multiples of the output length of HMAC_X). To this end, one simply computes an HMAC_X output that is (slightly) larger than the target length via Equation 4. Next, the last output bits of this result are just discarded (until we meet the target length).
Implementation of PRF TLS in TLS 1.2. The definition of PRF TLS in TLS 1.2 is different from TLS 1.1. First, the new standard allows client and server to negotiate the underlying hash function. However, SHA-256 is used in all pre-defined ciphersuites specified in the TLS standard and generally recommended. Second, the computation of PRF TLS no longer relies on two different hash functions but only on a single one. For SHA-256 the function thus simply looks like
Existing Results on the Security of PRF TLS . Let now us give a brief summary of the most important theoretical results. In [2] , Bellare proved that HMAC is a pseudo-random function when the underlying compression function of the hash function is a PRF when keyed by either the data input or the chaining value. In 2008, Foque, Pointcheval, and Zimmer (FPZ) showed that, while relying on [2] , for any key distribution with high min-entropy, HMAC [18] is a good strong randomness extractor under security assumptions that are related to the fact that the compression function of the underlying hash function behaves like a pseudo-random function [22] . In 2010, Fischlin, Lehmann, and Wagner (FLW) [20] specifically analyzed the key derivation function of TLS 1.1. In their analysis, FLW show that HMAC_X is a secure PRF if HMAC_X is a secure PRF. FLW rely on [2] (who showed that HMAC_X is pseudo-random) to base the security of PRF TLS on the security of the compression functions of the underlying hash functions. Very recently, Koblitz and Menezes gave a separation result showing that the proof of [2] actually does not apply to the standardized version of HMAC [30] without modifications (of the security assumptions). They also present a new proof of security of HMAC as standardized in [40] that holds in the uniform model of complexity. However, due to its large tightness loss, Koblitz and Menezes doubt that even their new and strengthened security proof is "good enough to serve as a convincing real-world guarantee of security of HMAC".
Application to PRF TLS . Unfortunately, none of these results directly proves that PRF TLS as used in TLS-PSK behaves like a DPRF. Nevertheless, they might in some cases serve as a strong indicator of the security of PRF TLS .
• When using TLS_PSK, the security of PRF TLS only relies on the secret key PSK, which is located in the last bits of pms. The results of FLW on the pseudo-randomness of HMAC_X do not only make it appear plausible that PRF TLS constitutes a PRF in TLS 1.1 but also in TLS 1.2. 2
• As another important example, consider the security of PRF TLS as specified in TLS 1.1 when using TLS_DHE_PSK and TLS_RSA_PSK. Recall that in TLS_DHE_PSK the pre-master secret is computed as pms := len Z ||Z||len P SK ||PSK. Assume that the length of PSK is such that len Z ||Z and len P SK ||PSK have equal bit length. When splitting pms in two halves, we now get that pms1 = len Z ||Z and pms2 = len P SK ||PSK are independent random keys. At this point, we may again rely on the results of FLW (and Lemma 2) to deduce that if an adversary may not reveal both, Z and PSK, the output of PRF TLS remains indistinguishable from a random value. In this case, PRF TLS practically constitutes a DPRF if HMAC_MD5 is a secure PRF for the key space len Z ||Z (with random Z) and HMAC_SHA is a secure PRF with key space len P SK ||PSK (for random PSK). We obtain an analogous result for TLS_RSA_PSK if the length of PSK is such that pms1 = C||V||R and pms2 = len P SK ||PSK.
However, in general PSK may have arbitrary size. In TLS_DHE_PSK for example, if PSK is relatively small it is likely that pms2 also consists of several bits of Z. In this case, HMAC_SHA is used with a key that not only consists of random bits of PSK but also of possibly adversarially manipulated bits of Z. Thus parts of the key bits of HMAC_SHA may be specified by the adversary. It is not clear if the results of FLW transfer to these situations as well.
ACCE protocols
In this section, we present an extension of the formal security model for two party authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocols introduced by JKSS [25] to also cover scenarios with pre-shared, symmetric keys. Additionally, we extend the model to also address PKIrelated attacks that exploit that the adversary does not have to prove knowledge of the secret key when registering a new public key [7] . (In [37] such attacks are generally called strong-key substitution attacks.) For better comparison with JKSS we will subsequently use boxes to highlight state variables that are essentially new in our model. In this model, while emulating the real-world capabilities of an active adversary, we provide an 'execution environment' for adversaries following the tradition of the seminal work of Bellare and Rogaway [4] and its extensions [6, 12, 31, 33, 25] . Let K 0 = {0, 1} κ be the key space of the session key and K 1 = {0, 1} κ be the key space of the pre-shared keys.
Execution Environment. In the following let , d ∈ N be positive integers. In the execution environment, we fix a set of honest parties {P 1 , . . . , P }. Each party is either identified by index i in the security experiment or a unique string id i with fixed length (which might appear in the protocol flows).
Long-term keys. To cover authentication with symmetric keys, we extend the state of each party to also include pre-shared keys. Each party holds (symmetric) pre-shared keys with all other parties.
We denote with PSK i.j = PSK j,i the symmetric key shared between parties P i and P j . Each party P i with i ∈ {1, . . . , } also has access to a long-term public/private key pair (pk i , sk i ). Formally, all parties maintain several state variables as described in Table 2 .
Variable Description sk i stores the secret key of a public key pair (pk i , sk i ) PSK i a vector which contains an entry PSK i,j per party P j τ i denotes, that sk i was corrupted after the τ i -th query of A f i a vector denoting the freshness of all pre-shared keys, containing one entry f i,j ∈ {exposed, fresh} for each entry in PSK i The first two variables, sk i and PSK i , are used to store keys that are used in the protocol execution while the remaining variables are solely used to define security, see below. (When defining security the latter are additionally managed and updated by the challenger.) The variables of each party P i will be initialized according to the following rules:
• The long-term key pair (pk i , sk i ) and pre-shared key vector PSK i are chosen randomly from the key space. For all parties P i , P j with i, j ∈ {1, . . . , } and with i = j, and pre-shared keys PSK i it holds that PSK i,j = PSK j,i and PSK i,i := ∅.
• All entries in f i are set to fresh.
• τ i is set to τ i := ∞, which means that all parties are initially not corrupted.
In the following, we will call party P i uncorrupted iff τ i = ∞. Thus, we do not consider a dedicated variable that holds the corruption state of the secret key sk i . Each honest party P i can sequentially and concurrently execute the protocol multiple times. This is characterized by a collection of oracles {π s i :
Oracle π s i behaves as party P i carrying out a process to execute the s-th protocol instance with some partner P j (which is determined during the protocol execution). All oracles of P i have access to the long-term keys sk i and PSK i with j ∈ {1, . . . , }. Moreover, we assume each oracle π s i maintains a list of independent internal state variables as described in Table 2 are used by the oracles to execute the protocol. The remaining variables are only used to define security. As in JKSS, u, v are simple counters used for defining security, whereas st e and st d hold the state information of the symmetric encryption system. C represents a list of ciphertexts that can be indexed by u and v.
The variables of each oracle π s i will be initialized with the following rules:
• The execution-state Φ s i is set to negotiating.
• The variable kst s i is set to fresh.
• The bit b s i is chosen at random.
• The counters u, v are initialized to 0.
• All other variables are set to only contain the empty string ∅.
revealed. We find our solution very natural. We stress that the problem is not restricted to our analysis of TLS-PSK but rather seems fundamental to security protocols in general (similar to the problem that an adversary may always drop the last protocol message which makes one party end up accepting although the transcripts of its partner oracle is actually different). We also remark that by using a distinct definition of partnership, we could seemingly avoid this problem, for example by using the definition of [32] (or an adapted form) that only spans the first three messages of TLS. However, this would come at the cost of generality of our definition and we refrain from doing so. Also, we remark that when providing a new partnership definition that is specific to some protocol, for example a truncated version of the transcript, there must be some additional formal evidence that this definition actually uniquely identifies sessions.
At some point, each oracle π s i completes the execution with a state Φ s i ∈ {accept, reject}. Furthermore, we will always assume (for simplicity) that K s i = ∅ if an oracle has not reached accept-state (yet).
Matching Conversations. To formalize the notion that two oracles engage in an on-line communication, we define partnership via matching conversations as proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [4] . We use the variant by JKSS. We assume that messages in a transcript T s i are represented as binary strings. Let |T s i | denote the number of messages. Assume there are two transcripts T s i and T t j of oracles π s i and π t j respectively. We say that T s i is a prefix of T t j and the first |T s i | messages in transcripts T s i and T t j are pairwise equivalent as binary strings.
Definition 7.
We say that an oracle π s i has a matching conversation to oracle π t j , if
• π s i has sent all protocol messages and T t j is a prefix of T s i , or
• π t j has sent all protocol messages and
To keep our definition of ACCE protocols general we do not consider protocol-specific definitions of partnership like for example [32] who define partnership of TLS sessions using only the first three messages exchanged in the handshake phase (see Remark 1 below).
Adversarial
Model. An adversary A in our model is a PPT taking as input the security parameter 1 κ and the public information (e.g. generic description of above environment), which may interact with these oracles by issuing the following queries.
This query sends message m to oracle π s i . The oracle will respond with the next message m * (if there is any) that should be sent according to the protocol specification and its internal states.
After answering a Send pre query, the variables (Φ s i , Pid s i , ρ s i , K s i , T s i ) will be updated depending on the protocol specification. This query is essentially defined as in JKSS.
RegisterParty(µ, pk µ , [psk]): This query allows A to register a new party with a new identity µ and a static public key (pk µ ) to be used for party P µ . In response, if the same identity µ is already registered (either via a RegisterParty-query or µ ∈ [ ]), a failure symbol ⊥ is returned. Otherwise, a new party P µ is added with the static public key pk µ . The secret key sk µ is set to a constant. The parties registered by this query are considered corrupted and controlled by the adversary. If RegisterParty is the τ -th query of the adversary, P µ is initialized with τ µ = τ . If the adversary also provides a pre-shared key psk, then this key will be implemented for every party P i with i ∈ [ ] as key PSK i,µ . 3 Otherwise, the simulator chooses a random key psk $ ← {0, 1} κ and sets PSK i,µ = PSK µ,i := psk for all parties P i before outputting psk. The corresponding entries f i,µ in the vectors of the other parties P i with i ∈ [ ] are set to exposed. Via this query we extend the ACCE model of JKSS to also model key registration.
RevealKey(π s i ):
Oracle π s i responds to a RevealKey-query with the contents of variable K s i , the application keys. At the same time the challenger sets kst s i = exposed. If at the point when A issues this query there exists another oracle π t j having matching conversation to π s i , then we also set kst t j = exposed for π t j . This query slightly deviates from JKSS to cover the attacks mentioned in Remark 1. 4 .
Depending on the second input parameter, oracle π 1 i responds with certain longterm secrets of party P i . This query extends the corruption capabilities of JKSS to symmetric keys.
• If A queries Corrupt(P i ) or Corrupt(P i , ∅) 5 , oracle π 1 i returns the long-term secret key sk i of party P i . If this query is the τ -th query issued by A, then we say that P i is τ -corrupted and π 1 i sets τ i := τ .
• If A queries Corrupt(P i , P j ), oracle π 1 i returns the symmetric pre-shared key PSK i,j stored in PSK i and sets f i,j := exposed.
• If A queries Corrupt(P i , ), oracle π 1 i returns the vector PSK i and sets f i,j := exposed for all entries f i, * ∈ f i . Remark 1. In the execution environment we need the state variable kst s i because we have to cope with a theoretical attack caused by the RevealKey query. Consider the situation when an uncorrupted server oracle π s i accepts and just sends out the encrypted finished message C S to its partner oracle π t j which up to now has matching conversation (which is defined next) with π s i . However at this point an adversary A may reveal the session key of π s i , drop C S and computes a ciphertext C S which encrypts the same finished message but differs from C S . Next, A sends C S to π t j . This problem is that now π t j still accepts, although it does not have matching conversation to π s i . To thwart this attack, we modify the RevealKey query and the corresponding security definition as compared to JKSS. In our definition, the challenger in the security game simply keeps track of which session keys have been queried by the adversary via kst s i (and kst t j ) and does not allow the adversary to break the security of any oracle whose session key has been revealed. We find our solution very natural. JKSS use a very similar solution. Roughly, they specify when a session key has been revealed by a partner oracle in the security definition whereas we use the definition of the RevealKey query to do so. We stress that the problem is not restricted to our analysis of TLS-PSK but rather seems fundamental to security protocols in general (similar to the problem that an adversary may always drop the last protocol message which makes one party end up accepting although the transcripts of its partner oracle is actually different). We also remark that by using a distinct definition of partnership, we could seemingly avoid this problem, for example by using the definition of [32] (or an adapted form) that only spans the first three messages of TLS. However, this would come at the cost of generality of our definition and we refrain from doing so. Also, we remark that when providing a new partnership definition that is specific to some protocol, for example a truncated version of the transcript, there must be some additional formal evidence that this definition actually uniquely identifies sessions.
Definition 8 (Correctness). We say that an ACCE protocol Π is correct, if for any two oracles π s i , π t j that have matching conversations with Pid s i = j and Pid t j = i and Φ s i = accept and Φ t j = accept it always holds that K s i = K t j .
Secure ACCE Protocols. We define security via an experiment played between a challenger and an adversary.
Security Game. Assume there is a global variable pinfo which stores the role information of each party for the considered protocol Π. 6 In the game, the following steps are performed:
1. Given the security parameter κ the challenger implements the collection of oracles {π s i : i, j ∈ [ ], s ∈ [d]} with respect to Π and pinfo. In this process, the challenger generates long-term keys PSK i for all parties i ∈ [ ]. Next it additionally generates long-term key pairs (pk i , sk i ) for all parties i ∈ [ ] that require them (e.g. if the corresponding party is a server in the TLS_RSA_PSK protocol). Finally, the challenger gives the adversary A all identifiers {id i }, all public keys (if any) and pinfo as input.
2. Next the adversary may start issuing Send pre , RevealKey, Corrupt, Encrypt, Decrypt, and RegisterParty queries.
3. At the end of the game, the adversary outputs a triple (i, s, b ) and terminates.
In the following, we provide a general security definition for ACCE protocols. It will subsequently be referred to when providing specific definitions for ACCE protocols that provide no forward secrecy, perfect forward secrecy or asymmetric perfect forward secrecy. We have tried to keep the details of the execution environment and the definition of security close to that of JKSS. Intuitively, our security definition mainly differs from JKSS in that it considers adversaries that also have access to the new RegisterParty query and the extended Corrupt query.
Definition 9 (ACCE Security). We say that an adversary (t, )-breaks an ACCE protocol, if A runs in time t, and at least one of the following two conditions holds:
1. When A terminates, then with probability at least there exists an oracle π s i such that
• π s i 'accepts' with Pid s i = j when A issues its τ 0 -th query, and • both P i and the intended partner P j 7 are not corrupted throughout the security game and
• π s i has internal state kst s i = fresh, and • there is no unique oracle π t j such that π s i has a matching conversation to π t j .
If an oracle π s i accepts in the above sense, then we say that π s i accepts maliciously.
When A terminates and outputs a triple (i, s, b ) such that
• π s i 'accepts -with a unique oracle π t j such that π s i has a matching conversation to π t jwhen A issues its τ 0 -th query, and
• A did not issue a RevealKey-query to oracle π s i nor to π t j , i.e. kst s i = fresh, and • P i is τ i -corrupted and P j is τ j -corrupted, then the probability that b equals b s i is bounded by
If an adversary A outputs (i, s, b ) such that b = b s i and the above conditions are met, then we say that A answers the encryption-challenge correctly.
We say that the ACCE protocol is (t, )-secure, if there exists no adversary that (t, )-breaks it.
Let us now define security more concretely. We consider three levels of forward secrecy. We start with a basic security definition for protocols that do not provide any form of forward secrecy.
Definition 10 (ACCE Security without Forward Secrecy). We say that an ACCE protocol is (t, )-secure without forward secrecy (NoFS), if it is (t, )-secure with respect to Definition 9 and
The next definition considers PFS in the classical sense for both, client and server, as in JKSS.
Definition 11 (ACCE Security with Perfect Forward Secrecy). We say that an ACCE protocol is (t, )-secure with perfect forward secrecy (PFS), if it is (t, )-secure with respect to Definition 9 and τ i , τ j > τ 0 .
In the following, we provide our new definition of asymmetric perfect forward secrecy which is similar to that of classical perfect forward secrecy except that only the client is allowed to be corrupted after it has accepted. Server oracles may not be corrupted after accepting (such that for them security holds only in the basic sense of Definition 10). We will later show that TLS-RSA-PSK fulfills this extended definition of security.
Definition 12 (ACCE Security with Asymmetric Perfect Forward Secrecy). We say that an ACCE protocol is (t, )-secure with asymmetric perfect forward secrecy (APFS), if it is (t, )-secure with respect to Definition 9 and it holds that τ i = ∞ and τ j > τ 0 if π s i has internal state ρ = Server or τ i > τ 0 and τ j = ∞ if π s i has internal state ρ = Client.
Security Analysis of Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security
In this section we will analyse the security of each TLS-PSK ciphersuite with the following theorems respectively. Due to space restrictions, the complete proofs were postponed to the Appendix. Theorem 1. Let µ be the output length of PRF TLS and let λ be the length of the nonces. Assume that PRF TLS is a (t, PRF )-secure PRF when keyed with the pre-master secret pms := N ||0...0||N ||PSK or the master secret ms. Suppose the hash function H is (t, H )-secure, and the sLHAE scheme is (t, StE )-secure. Then for any adversary that (t , tls )-breaks the TLS_PSK protocol in the sense of Definition 10 with t ≈ t it holds that
The full proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A. Theorem 2. Let µ be the output length of PRF TLS and let λ be the length of the nonces. Assume that the key derivation function PRF TLS is a (t, DPRF )-secure DPRF when keyed with the pre-master secret pms := len Z ||Z||len P SK ||PSK (that consists of the pre-shared secret PSK and the DiffieHellman value Z). Assume that PRF TLS is a (t, PRF )-secure PRF when keyed with the master secret ms. Suppose the hash function H is (t, H )-secure, the DDH-problem is (t, DDH )-hard in the group G used to compute the TLS pre-master secret, and that the sLHAE scheme is (t, StE )-secure.
Then for any adversary that (t , tls )-breaks TLS_DHE_PSK protocol in the sense of Definition 11 with t ≈ t holds that
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. Let µ be the output length of PRF TLS and let λ be the length of the nonces. Assume that the key derivation function PRF TLS is a (t, DPRF )-secure DPRF when keyed with the premaster secret pms with pms := C||V||R||len P SK ||PSK (that consists of the pre-shared key PSK and the random key R that is exchanged between client and server). Assume that PRF TLS is a (t, PRF )-secure PRF when keyed with the master secret ms. Suppose the hash function H is (t, H )-secure, the public key encryption scheme PKE is (t, PKE )-secure (IND-CCA). Suppose that the sLHAE scheme is (t, StE )-secure.
Then for any adversary that (t , tls )-breaks the TLS_RSA_PSK protocol (where the key transport mechanism is implemented via PKE) in the sense of Definition 12 with t ≈ t it holds that
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix C. As mentioned before, our result does not cover key transport with RSA-PKCS as used in TLS that is known to not provide IND-CCA security. We stress again that when proving that TLS_RSA_PSK is ACCE secure without forward secrecy, one does not require any security assumption on the PKE scheme. This is because security solely relies on the secrecy of the pre-shared secret. The proof is very similar to the proof of TLS_PSK and omitted therefore. Similarly, TLS_DHE_PSK can be proven ACCE secure without forward secrecy without relying on the DDH assumption.
Technical Overview of the Security Proofs. At a high level, the security proofs are similar to that of JKSS. From a technical standpoint, the security proof of TLS_PSK is simpler than that of most of the classical ciphersuites of TLS as security only relies on the secrecy of the pre-shared secrets. Roughly, in the proofs of the classical TLS ciphersuites one additionally has to establish that the key exchange mechanism produces a shared secret in the first place. 8 To prove TLS_RSA_PSK and TLS_DHE_PSK we exploit the DPRF-security of PRF TLS . The challenge is to show that the master secret is indistinguishable from random although the adversary may reveal the pre-shared secret or a freshly generated ephemeral secret. Intuitively, if only one value, the pre-shared secret or the freshly exchanged secret, remains unrevealed by the adversary, then at least one input key to the DPRF PRF TLS is (indistinguishable from) random. Therefore, PRF TLS computes a random-looking master secret which in turn can be used to derive secure application keys.
We prove Theorem 1 by the following two lemmas. Lemma 3 bounds the probability auth that an authentication-adversary succeeds, Lemma 4 bounds the probability enc that an encryptionadversary succeeds. Then we have tls ≤ auth + enc Lemma 3. For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that there exists an oracle π s i that accepts maliciously is at most
where all quantities are defined as stated in Theorem 1.
Note that auth is an upper bound on the probability that there exists an oracle that accepts maliciously.
Proof. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games, where the first game is the real security experiment. We then describe several intermediate games that modify the original game step-by-step, and argue that our complexity assumptions imply that each game is computationally indistinguishable from the previous one. We end up in the final game, where no adversary can break the security of the protocol. Let S 1 δ be the event that occurs when the first oracle that accepts maliciously in the sense of Definition 10 in Game δ.
Game 0. This game equals the ACCE security experiment described in Section 4. Thus, for some that chooses a random nonce r i or r j which is not unique.
Note that now each oracle has a unique nonce r i or r j , which is included in the signatures. We will use this to ensure that each oracle that accepts with non-corrupted partner has a unique partner oracle.
Game 2. We try to guess which oracle will be the first oracle to accept maliciously and its partner oracle. If our guess is incorrect, i.e. if there is another oracle that accepts before, then we abort this game. Technically, this game is identical to previous game, except for the following modifications. The challenger guesses two random indices (i * , s * , j * , t * )
If there exists an oracle π s i that 'accepts' maliciously with intended communication partner P j (i.e. oracle π t j ), and (i, s, j, t) = (i * , s * , j * , t * ), then the challenger aborts the game. Note that if π s i is the first oracle that 'accepts' maliciously, then with probability 1/(d ) 2 we have (i, s, j, t) = (i * , s * , j * , t * ), and thus
Note that in this game the attacker can only break the security of the protocol, if oracle π s * i * is the first oracle that 'accepts' maliciously, as otherwise the game is aborted. Game 3. In this game we replace the master secret ms computed by π s * i * with an independent random value ms. Moreover, if π t * j * computes the master key using the same nonces r * i ||r * j as π s * i * , then we set its master key to ms as well. We make use of the fact that the pre-shared keys PSK are chosen uniformly at random from the key space of PRF TLS . Distinguishing Game 3 from Game 2 implies an algorithm breaking the security of the pseudo-random function PRF TLS , thus Game 7. In this game we show that any successful adversary can be used to break the sLHAEsecurity of the encryption system. This step is necessary, as an adversary can violate the matching conversations (MC) definition (and thus make an oracle accept maliciously) by creating a new, valid encryption (C C or C S ) of one of the Finished messages (fin C or fin S ), which is distinct from the ciphertext output by the corresponding oracle (Client or Server) or of any other messages sent later. Therefore, we need to make sure that A is not able to generate new, valid symmetric encryptions of the Finished messages. To this end we exploit the properties of the sLHAE scheme. The forged ciphertexts produced by the adversary are either computed using k Client enc or using k Client dec . The challenger can guess in which of the two keys are used with probability at least 1/2. On failure, it simply aborts. On success, the challenger can embed the sLHAE challenge into this key.
According to the sLHAE security of the symmetric encryption scheme, A has advantage at most StE in breaking the sLHAE security. The access to the oracles in the sLHAE security game can directly be used to implement the Encrypt and Decrypt query of the ACCE security game. Observe that the values generated in this game are exactly distributed as in the previous game. We have
Collecting probabilities from Game 0 to Game 7 yields Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that A answers the encryption-challenge correctly in the sense of Definition 10 is at most 1/2 + enc with
where auth is an upper bound on the probability that there exists an oracle that accepts maliciously in the sense of Definition 10 (cf. Lemma 3) and all other quantities are defined as stated in Theorem 1. We note that at this this point we have now excluded active adversaries between and, moreover, for all τ and any τ -fresh oracle π s i there is a unique oracle π t j such that π s i and π t j have matching conversations. Therefore, any accepting oracle has an uniquely identified partner oracle.
Game 2. Technically, this game is identical to the previous game, except for the following modifications. The challenger aborts if it fails to guess the oracle π s * i * (and its partner π t * j * ) that the adversary attacks. The probability that the challenger guesses correctly is at least 1/(d ) 2 we have
Game 3. In this game we replace the master secret ms computed by π s * i * with an independent random value ms. Moreover, if π t * j * compute the master key using same nonces r * i ||r * j as π s * i * , then we set its master key as ms. We make use of the fact that each pre-shared key is chosen uniformly at random from the key space of PRF TLS . Distinguishing Game 3 from Game 2 implies an algorithm breaking the security of the pseudo-random function PRF TLS , thus in the stateful symmetric encryption scheme is uniformly random and independent of all TLS Handshake messages exchanged in the pre-accept phase. The challenger can again guess (with probability at least 1/2) the key that is used to create the ciphertexts which the adversary attacks (either k Client enc or k Client dec ) and embedd the sLHAE challenge in it. So we construct a simulator B that uses a successful ACCE attacker A to break the security of the underlying sLHAE secure symmetric encryption scheme (see Section 2.4). By assumption, the simulator B is given access to an encryption oracle Encrypt and a decryption oracle Decrypt. B embeds the sLHAE experiment by simply forwarding all Encrypt(π s * i * , ·) queries to Encrypt, and all Decrypt(π t * j * , ·) queries to Decrypt. Otherwise it proceeds as the challenger in Game 4. As before we have
If A outputs a triple (i * , s * , b ), then B forwards b to the sLHAE challenger. Otherwise it outputs a random bit. Since the simulator essentially relays all messages it is easy to see that an attacker A having advantage yields an attacker B against the sLHAE security of the encryption scheme with success probability at least 1/2 + . Since by assumption any attacker has advantage at most StE in breaking the sLHAE security of the symmetric encryption scheme, we have
Summing up probabilities from Lemmas 3 and 4, we obtain that
which proves Theorem 1.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Similar to the previous proof, we prove Theorem 2 via two lemmas. Lemma 5 bounds the probability auth that an authentication-adversary succeeds, Lemma 6 bounds the probability enc that an encryption-adversary succeeds. Then we have tls ≤ auth + enc Lemma 5. For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that there exists an oracle π s i that accepts maliciously in the sense of Definition 11 is at most
where all quantities are defined as stated in Theorem 2.
Proof. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games.
Game 0. This game equals the AKE security experiment described in Section 4. Game 3. In this game, we replace the master secret ms that is generated by π s * i * with a with the output ms of a truly random function RF PSK,Z . Moreover, if π s * i * and π t * j * have computed the same random nonces and the same Diffie-Hellman value Z, we set the master secret of π t * j * to ms as well. Otherwise we compute the master secret of π t * j * as specified in the protocol. We exploit that PRF TLS is a (t, DPRF )-secure DPRF by showing that any adversary that recognizes our modification can be used to build a successful attacker against the DPRF properties of PRF TLS . In the DPRF security game the simulator first calls Init(1), indicating that it wants to specify the Diffie-Hellman value when making its DPRF queries. Furthermore it will use the queries granted in the DPRF security game to compute the outputs of PRF TLS . Now, ifb = 0 in the DPRF security game, we are in the previous game of the proof. In caseb = 1 we are in the current game of the proof. So, any adversary A that distinguishes Game 3 from Game 2 implies a DPRF-adversary B that breaks the DPRF-security of PRF TLS .
We get that Pr[S Lemma 6. For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that A answers the encryption-challenge correctly in the sense of Definition 11 is at most 1/2 + enc with
where auth is an upper bound on the probability that there exists an oracle that accepts maliciously in the sense of Definition 11 (cf. Lemma 5) and all other quantities are defined as stated in Theorem 2.
pms = len Z ||g w ||len PSK ||PSK i * ,j * . Recall that by assumption the DH key will at no time be revealed by the adversary (in contrast to the pre-shared keys). 9 Suppose that there exists an algorithm A distinguishing Game 3 from Game 2. Then we can construct an algorithm B solving the DDH problem as follows. B receives as input (g, g u , g v , g z ). It implements the challenger for A as in Game 2, except that it sets T i * ,s * := g u and T j * ,t * := g v , and the pre-master secret of π s * i * and π t * j * equal to pms := len Z ||g z ||len PSK ||PSK i * ,j * . Note that B can simulate all messages exchanged between π s * i * and π t * j * properly, in particular the finished messages using knowledge of pms = len Z ||g z ||len PSK ||PSK i * ,j * . Since all other oracles are not modified, B can simulate these oracles properly as well. If z = uv, then the view of A when interacting with B is identical to Game 2, while if z $ ← Z q then it is identical to Game 3. Thus, the DDH assumption implies that Adv 2 ≤ Adv 3 + DDH Game 4. Recall that π s * i * computes the master secret as ms = PRF TLS (len Z ||Z||len PSK ||PSK i * ,j * , label 1 ||r i * ||r j * ), where Z denotes the random group element chosen by π s * i * and π t * j * . In this game we replace the master secret ms computed by π s * i * and π t * j * with an independent random value ms. By assumption we have that PRF TLS constitutes a secure DPRF when at least one of the values Z or PSK is random and not revealed. Due to the security of PRF TLS , we have that Adv 3 ≤ Adv 4 + DPRF Game 5. We now replace the function PRF TLS ( ms, ·) used by π s * i * and π t * j * to derive the application keys with a random function RF ms . Of course the same random function is used for both oracles π s * i * and π t * j * . In particular, this function is used to compute the key material as or k Client dec ) it needs to embed the sLHAE challenge. With probability at least 1/2 its guess is correct. On failure it aborts. Again, we get Adv 5 = 2 · Adv 6 B simulates the ACCE experiment by simply forwarding all Encrypt(π s * i * , ·) queries to Encrypt in the sLHAE game, and all Decrypt(π t * j * , ·) queries to Decrypt in the sLHAE game. Otherwise it proceeds as the challenger in Game 5. Observe that the values generated in this game are exactly distributed as in the previous game.
If A outputs a triple (i * , s * , b ), then B forwards b to the sLHAE challenger. Otherwise it outputs a random bit. Since the simulator essentially relays all messages it is easy to see that an attacker A having advantage yields an attacker B against the sLHAE security of the encryption scheme with success probability at least 1/2 + .
Since by assumption, any attacker has advantage at most StE in breaking the sLHAE security of the symmetric encryption scheme, we have
Summing up probabilities from Lemmas 5 and 6 proves Theorem 2.
C Proof of Theorem 3
In the proof of this theorem, we consider the following two lemmas. Lemma 7 bounds the probability auth that an adversary makes an oracle accept maliciously. Lemma 8 bounds the probability enc that an adversary breaks the APFS encryption challenge. Then we have tls ≤ enc + auth We prove Theorem 3 via the following lemmas.
Lemma 7. For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that there exists an oracle π s i that accepts maliciously in the sense of Definition 12 is at most
The bound on auth is derived almost exactly like in the proof of Lemma 5, therefore we omit the details.
Lemma 8. For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that A answers the encryption-challenge correctly in the sense of Definition 12 is at most 1/2 + enc with enc ≤ auth + (d )
where auth is an upper bound on the probability that there exists an oracle that accepts maliciously in the sense of Definition 12 (cf. Lemma 7) and all other quantities are defined as stated in Theorem 3.
